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ABSTRACT: The hypothesis of the Extended Cognition (ExCog), formulated by 
Clark and Chalmers (1998), aims to be a bold and new hypothesis about realisers 
of cognitive processes. It claims that sometimes cognitive processes extend above 
the limits of the skin and skull and include chunks of the environment as their par-
tial realisers. One of the most pursuassive arguments in support of this assertion 
is the famous “parity argument” which calls upon functional similarities between 
extended cognitive processes and relevant internal processes. This very kind of 
reasoning gave rise to several arguments against ExCog by way of comparing it 
to functionalism about the mental, which conclude that ExCog must be trivial, 
radical or unjustified. In this paper ExCog and the underlying parity principle 
will be defended against four different kinds of “functionalist” arguments. It will 
be argued that ExCog can be justified as a special form of functionalism, that it 
is not trivial nor entailed by the known versions of functionalism, and that the 
accusation of it being too radical is unwarranted.
KEY WORDS: Extended cognition, functionalism, Martian intuition, parity principle.
Although the hypothesis of Extended Cognition (ExCog) and functiona-
lism share some common assumptions, the former is not reducible to the 
latter, nor is it the case that functionalism simply entails ExCog.** Many 
* This paper has been presented at the philosophical Jam Session at the Faculty of 
Philosophy in Rijeka, organised to present and critically discuss newly published two-
volume book Philosophy written by Boran Berčić. The idea behind the symposium was 
to incite a fruitful philosophical discussion that would be induced by numerous topics 
that Boran masterly and expertly addressed in his new book. The symposium was highly 
successful in achieving this goal and many interesting presentations and discussions on 
metaphysical, ethical, epistemological, semantic, and logical problems and issues took 
place. My own presentation was inspired by Boran’s treatment of functionalism and the 
topic of the nature of internalism and externalism, so I decided to talk about the connec-
tion between Extended Cognition (the subject matter of my ongoing research) and the two 
aforementioned topics, in order to steer attention to their strong relations.
** This article is a result of my research done within the project “Dynamical systems 
in nature and society: philosophical and empirical aspects” (179041) supported by the 
Ministry of education, science and technological development of the Republic of Serbia.
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authors have observed that these two views have more then one thing in 
common (see, e.g., Rupert 2004, 2009; Menary 2007; Clark 2008; Adams 
& Aizawa 2008; Wheeler 2010; Walter 2010; Sutton 2010; Drayson 2010). 
Some of them argued that ExCog is a special form of “extended functi-
onalism” (Clark 2008; Wheeler 2010), and some of them even claimed 
that ExCog is just a consequence of a radical form of role functionalism 
(Sprevak 2009). Nevertheless, it is extremely important to drive a wedge 
between them, if ExCog is to be regarded as an independent and philosop-
hically interesting thesis. In order to separate the common forms of functi-
onalism and ExCog, we shall start with the foundational claims of ExCog 
as they are formulated by Clark and Chalmers, and we will proceed with 
addressing four types of argument which question ExCog’s plausibility by 
way of comparing it to functionalism.
1. ExCog and the Parity argument
Most of us believe that the neural body is a physical basis of all mental and 
cognitive states and processes, and that they causally interact with the rest 
of the world in a direct, non-mysterious way. We are also aware of a strong 
influence of the environment on the ways we think about it, percieve it and 
act upon it. So, what is usually taken for granted is the physical realisation 
or constitution of the mental and the cognitive and its dependence on envi-
ronmental factors. The core ExCog claim that separates it from this main-
stream physicalistic assumptions, is that sometimes parts of the cognitive 
systems or processes literally extended into the environment. That is, the 
proponents of ExCog argue that besides neurons parts of the environment 
and our non-neural bodies sometimes constitute, in the most robust sense 
of the word “constitute”, processes traditionally recognised as cognitive.
The argument in favour of the contemporary version1 of ExCog that 
started an avalanche of responses was brought foreward by Clark and 
Chalmers in their seminal paper “The Extended Mind”. The argument was 
later dubbed “the parity argument” because it was based on parity consi-
derations. It was originally stated with the omitted second premise (b), and 
the affirmation of the antecedent of (a) is justified later in their paper with 
the use of two cases of extended cognitive states and processes:
a) “If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recog-
1 The predecessors of the ExCog being Dewey, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, etc. 
amongst philosophers, Bertalanffy, Maturana and Varela, Bateson, Gibson, etc. amongst 
scientists.
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nizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so 
we claim) part of the cognitive process.” (Clark & Chalmers 1998/2008: 
222): “The Parity principle”
b) A case of an external (or partly external) process which functions as a 
process which were it done in the head we would not hesitate to call it a 
cognitive process (see Clark & Chalmers 1998/2008: 220–221, 226–230, 
section 3 of this paper).
c) “Cognitive processes ain’t (all) in the head!” (Clark & Chalmers 
1998/2008:222): Core claim of ExCog
Even if the conclusion of this particular argument could be regarded as 
strange and “over the top”, allowances need to be made for the fact that 
there is nothing unfamiliar or strange in the way it was argued for. As 
Shapiro wittily notices, this kind of argument has been around for a long 
time and “perhaps the best known parity argument concerns a duck: If it 
walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and flies like a duck, it is a duck” 
(2010: 182). What this argument does is draw on our intuitions about a) 
what should be regarded as cognitive (“we would have no hesitation in 
recognizing…”) and b) what should be regarded as functionally similar 
(“if, …, a part of the world functions as…”), which consequently en-
able, some will think, a somewhat awkward conclusion about cognitive 
extension. We can say that there are too many intuitions and not enough 
theory in this story, but calling upon our intuitions should not be con-
sidered as a particularly weak spot of this argument. This is because, 
unfortunately, there is no commonly accepted theory of what makes a 
cognitive process cognitive so making informed intuitions is all we have 
to go by. And for that reason, there are no a priori grounds for exclud-
ing parts of the environment as parts of the cognitive processes. There is 
another worry, though: that “the parity principle stresses the functional 
isomorphism of inner and outer processes and states” (Sutton 2010: 
195)2 and that building an argument on functional similarities makes 
ExCog just a disguised version of functionalism. If extended cognitive 
processes are just those processes which are partly executed in the en-
vironment and are functionally isomorphic to internal processes widely 
recognised as cognitive, what is the difference between functionalism 
and ExCog? And what are the consequences if they are not in fact dif-
ferent?
2 Sutton distinguishes between two kinds of ExCog thesis: “first wave” based on 
parity principle, and “second wave” based on complementarity principle which stresses 
not the similarity but the complementarity of external and internal processes. We will be 
focusing exclusively on the “first wave” ExCog.
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2. Four “functionalist” types of argument threatening 
ExCog or the Parity principle
There are several types of argument that can be found in the recent lit-
erature aimed to dismiss either ExCog itself or the Parity principle (PP), 
based on their relations to functionalism. We can distinguish among at 
least four types of them. They all share the assumption that PP is a form 
of a functionalist thesis from which they reach different conclusions con-
cerning the plausibility of ExCog supported by PP.3
I Anti-functionalist arguments
Robert Rupert is certainly one of the most prominent critics of ExCog. 
He notices a strong functionalist strain brought into ExCog by PP. But 
instead of regarding this as an independent support for ExCog he argues 
that because extended processes do not satisfy common functional roles it 
has to be justified independently of functionalism and PP (2004: 422–426; 
2009: 90–96).
1) Extended processes do not satisfy appropriate functional roles of 
internal cognitive processes which are defined in ordinary langu-
age or in science (for examples see section 7).
2) ExCog cannot be entailed by any kind (commonsense nor scienti-
fic) of functionalism. (Rupert 2009: 92–93)
3) PP cannot be effective as an argument for supporting ExCog if it 
uses functionalism to support it.
In other words he denies premise b) of the “parity argument” by rea-
ding the “function as” as a “function as” of functionalism. The justifica-
tion of 1) is given by a number of examples showing that best candidates 
for ExCog actual cases do not satisfy appropriate functional roles, they are 
just too fine-grained. These examples could be found in Adams and Ai-
zawa (2001: 54–56, 2008: 135–141), Rupert (2004, 2009), Sutton (2010: 
196–198), and others.
II Single realisation argument
This kind of argument is offered by Shapiro (2004: 172–175) and it also 
threatens PP and functionalist traits of ExCog, but not ExCog itself if we 
find a way to argue for it independently of PP.
3 Arguments presented are “freely reshaped” for the purposes of this paper.
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4) ExCog is a kind of embodied cognition thesis (EmCog).
5) EmCog implies that cognitive processes deeply depend on bodily 
and environmental realisers. (Cognitive processes are what they 
are because of their realisers.)
6) Embodied processes (nor extended) cannot be multiply realisable.
7) Multiple realisability cannot be used in support of ExCog.
8) PP cannot be used in support of ExCog.
Shapiro sees the disembodiment of the mind, assumed by functio-
nalism, as a reason enough for ExCognitivist to abandon “mind as a pro-
gram” functionalist view as the last remain of the dogma of the ghost in the 
machine. Cognitive processes are not specifiable independently from their 
physical properties, and should not, therefore, be functionally defined.4
III Triviality arguments
This kind of argumentation is described or used by Wheeler (2008), Spre-
vak (2009), and Walter (2010). Contrary to Rupert’s argument which 
shows that ExCog cannot be entailed by functionalism nor PP, they notice 
that even if ExCog could be supported by it and consequently by PP, Ex-
Cog would become trivial.
 9) If (any known version of) functionalism entails ExCog, then 
ExCog is philosophically uninteresting and it is probably “just a 
footnote to Putnam” (Wheeler’s expression 2008).
10) If (PP and “there is a partly external process that functions as an 
internal cognitive process”), then ExCog.
11) PP is just a form of functionalism (plus parity considerations 
which do not have true argumentative value; see Walter 2010).
12) If (functionalism and “there is an extended process that functions 
as an internal cognitive process”), then ExCog.
13) ExCog is trivial.
Walter also argues that in order to determine functional roles which 
are coarse-grained enough to be satisfied by both internal and extended 
processes we already have to know what is “the mark of the cognitive”5, 
4 “The claim that minds are multiply realizable suggests that there are no particular 
physical properties necessary for minds. The claim that minds and bodies are independent, 
that the properties of the mind can be investigated in isolation from those of the body, sug-
gests that the mind is like the occupant of a house.” (Shapiro 2004: 227)
5 Adams & Aizawa’s basic argument against ExCog asks for the “mark of the cogni-
tive” (2001, 2008). They claim that in order to identify any process as cognitive we have to 
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which makes PP completely inefficient because if we knew what makes a 
cognitive process cognitive we could argue for or against ExCog directly. 
So, either is ExCog trivial, or is entailed by functionalism which employs 
a specific notion of cognition which makes PP argument redundant. In any 
case, it is not PP which gives the true support to ExCog.
IV Absurdity arguments
Sprevak (2009) formulated an argument that caused a lot of attention. He 
went another step further in the debate against ExCog and argued that 
functionalism which could entail ExCog would be so radical that it would 
make ExCog and itself completely absurd. The form of the argument rests 
on simple transitivity:
14) If there is a version of functionalism that entails ExCog it must 
support Martian intuition.
15) If functionalism supports Martian intuition it will turn out to be 
too radical.
16) Functionalism that supports ExCog is too radical (absurd) as well 
as ExCog itself.
In order to show that 15) is true Sprevak uses a controversial Mayan 
calendar example.
It looks that we are in an indefensible position if we want to keep PP 
as an effective argument for ExCog. While the first two types of arguments 
show that we cannot use functionalism (nor PP) in order to justify or effec-
tively argue in favor of ExCog, the third and forth kinds of argument are 
trying to prove that assuming functionalism (or PP) has catastrophic con-
sequences for ExCog as an independent and plausible position. So, both 
affirming and denying that ExCog is entailed by functionalism reflects 
adversely on ExCog. It looks like there is no way out: if the functional 
roles are defined too finely as in type I argument then we cannot find a 
suitable candidate of an extended realiser, if they are defined too coarsely 
as in type IV argument then ExCog is absurd, and if the appropriate roles 
are just fine as in type III argument then ExCog is simply trivial.6
It is tempting to abandon PP and affirm ExCog in a non-functionalist 
way. This would enable us to avoid the four aforementioned arguments 
altogether. But this is neither the only way nor the route to follow, because 
the parity argument is one of the best argument offered to support ExCog. 
know what is the mark of the cognitive, and their suggestion is that it is the “non-derived 
content” which is absent from extended processes.
6 There should be a third way too and that is denying that PP gets its strength through 
functionalism, but we are not going to follow that line of argumentation.
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A way out for the parity principle driven ExCognitivist can be in explicitly 
formulating a variety of functionalism which will both support ExCog and 
be sufficiently different from all typical forms of functionalism which lead 
to triviality claims. A newly defined kind of functionalism should secure 
that ExCog follows from it and not from its common kinds. Clark’s de-
fence of ExCog (2008) against I and II in terms of the notion of “extended 
functionalism” is part of this strategy. This strategy needs to be carefully 
laid out in order to show how precisely it functions and applies to III and 
IV types of anti-ExCog arguments too. But first we have to clarify what is 
claimed by PP and common kinds of functionalism.
3. Otto, Inga, and playing Tetris
Let us turn to the original examples Clark & Chalmers offered as a support 
of the premise (b) of the parity argument (“A case of an external (or partly 
external) process which functions as a process which were it done in the 
head we would not hesitate to call it a cognitive process”, see section 1). 
That way we shall see what kind of functional roles are those believed to 
entitle us to non-trivial claims about cognitive extension. Clark & Chalmers 
have two kinds of extension in mind, one being dubbed cognitive, the other 
the extension of the mind. The difference between the two is illustrated by 
way of examples. The extended mind example utilises a paradigmatic men-
tal state (in particular dispositional belief), meaning a state which has either 
conscious or intentional property, while the ExCog illustration utilises an 
example of a cognitive process. Interestingly, the ongoing debates tend to 
focus on the cognitive extension, rather than on the mental extension. The 
reason for dropping the latter is probably due to its implying that conscious 
states could be extended too, which is a controversial matter. So, nowdays 
“ExCog” is usually used to cover all cases of mental and cognitive exten-
sion without being committed to including conscious states as well.
In defence of the cognitive extension view Clark and Chalmers con-
struct a scenario aimed to show what kind of processes involved in human 
problem-solving should count as cognitive according to the PP. The sce-
nario describes different ways of Tetris playing:
(1) A person sits in front of a computer … and is asked to answer questions 
concerning the potential fit of such shapes into depicted “sockets”. To 
assess fit, the person must mentally rotate the shapes to align them with 
the sockets.
(2) A person … can choose either to physically rotate the image on the 
screen, by pressing a rotate button, or to mentally rotate the image as 
before …
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(3) Sometime in the cyberpunk future, a person … has the benefit of a neu-
ral implant which can perform the rotation operation as fast as the com-
puter in the previous example. The agent must still choose which internal 
resource to use … (Clark & Chalmers, 1998: 220–221)
After being introduced to these three different types of solutions of the 
same problem, namely, image rotation, we are invited to notice a couple of 
similarity relations between them. It is said that “case (3) with the neural 
implant seems clearly to be on a par with case (1). And case (2) with the 
rotation button displays the same sort of computational structure as case 
(3)” (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 221). By applying the PP to the second 
case, or the case involving parts of the environment––button pressing, this 
extended process should be considered cognitive because it “functions as” 
the first case.
On the other hand, Clark and Chalmers write about the extended 
mind using the Otto-Inga case which relies on external objects as reali-
sers of dispositional beliefs. The main actors in the scenario are Inga, a 
healthy subject, and Otto who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease and con-
stantly carries with him a notebook in which he writes down every piece 
of information worth remembering. They are both living in New York and 
they both enjoy contemporary art. One day Inga and Otto are told, inde-
pendently, that a new exhibition in MoMA is opened and, in accordance 
with their artistic preferences, they wish to visit it. In order to fulfil this 
wish they need to consult their memories to retrieve the information about 
the MoMA’s address. Whereas Inga as a healthy cognitive subject uses 
her biological memory to access her old beliefs, Otto, being affected by 
Alzheimer’s disease, has to consult his notebook for retrieving similar in-
formation. The scenario then directly employs the parity principle: “for in 
relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays for 
Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga” (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 
227). There is no a priori reason to reject the hypothesis that information 
stored in Otto’s notebook are instances of Otto’s dispositional beliefs. “We 
are happy to explain Inga’s action in terms of her occurrent desire to go 
to the museum and her standing belief that the museum is on the 53rd 
street, and we should be happy to explain Otto’s action in the same way” 
(ibid.).
One way to answer the functionalist arguments against ExCog li-
sted earlier is to point to the distinction just introduced––the distinction 
between the extended cognition and the extended mind. Functionalism is a 
theory of the mind and not a theory of cognition, so it should be applicable 
only to the latter. Cognitive processes as studied by cognitive science are 
mechanisms underlying mental phenomena recognised by folk psycho-
logy, and not necessarily these phenomena themselves. They are described 
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by cognitive psychologist as information processing activities. Accepting 
the difference that mental phenomena are most usually conceptualised as 
mental states, and cognitive phenomena as cognitive processes there is yet 
another difference between the constituents of the mind and the constitu-
ents of cognition. The difference between mental states and information 
states that cognitive processes operate on is that states which are part of 
cognitive processes do not have to be consciously accessible nor concep-
tually structured, unlike genuine mental states. Thus, cognitive is taken to 
be a broader notion than the mental, including many isolated states and 
operations which would not be recognised by commonsense as mental, 
like Chomsky’s grammar or low level perceptual processes. As Drayson 
(2010) rightly notices not many authors in the debate about ExCog make 
a distinction between the cognitive and mental extension. This insight can 
be broadened to also include a distinction between processes and states 
which is often overlooked. But instead of completely discarding the argu-
ments against ExCog based on its pressuposed connection with functiona-
lism as non-starters we will read functionalism as liberally as possible to 
include not only traditionally recognised mental states but also processes 
such as remembering or mental rotation. Also, we will not exclude the 
Otto-Inga case as an example of cognitive extension, and we shall conce-
ive it as a special case of ExCog which can also function as an example 
of the extended mind. We shall conceive it as a case of extended remem-
bering which as its extended part has a dispositional belief. What makes 
the Otto-Inga case an example of mental extension too is that it involves a 
genuine mental state as a part of a cognitive process. We shall treat exam-
ples of cognitive and mental extension as presupposing the same notion 
of function, and we should examine now to what kind of functions functi-
onalism is committed to and if there are some contradicting assumptions 
that ExCog and functionalism employ respectively.
4. Different kinds of functionalism
Functionalism about the mental arose from different insights and in op-
position to the mind-brain identity theory which identified types of men-
tal states with types of physical states. The identity theory was facing 
the distinct properties objection7 and it was also incompatible with an 
assumption that creatures different from humans can have the same men-
tal states as them, because these states would be physically distinct from 
7 The distinct properties argument claims that expression of the identity of mental 
state with a physical state utilising mental and physical terms introduces substantially dis-
tinct properties by which we identify this one and the same state.
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those in humans. Putnam’s and Fodor’s insight that the mind could be 
seen as a kind of a Turing machine and that mental states could be de-
fined by the functional roles they play opened a way for the much needed 
topic-neutral analysis of mental terms (Armstrong, Lewis) which would 
enable an answer compatible with physicalism to the distinct properties 
argument and facilitate a coherent account of mulitple realisability of the 
mental.8
Functionalism is applicable to both experiential and intentional states, 
but we are going to focus on the latter because we have already narrowed 
ExCog’s domain to non-conscious states and processes. So, if we ask our-
selves what beliefs are, for instance, they are states that are caused by 
appropriate perceptions or other beliefs by inference, and which conjoined 
with appropriate desires cause certain sorts of behaviour (see Levin 2009). 
The functional roles are defined using the ordinary commonsense or sci-
entific practice for recognising mental states, meaning that they are con-
ceived at the macro observational level. The functions in question are not 
some hidden functions at the neural level, they are functions that connect 
human perception to action or sensory stimulus to behaviour together 
with other mental states just like, it seems, functions in the examples of 
ExCog.9 But now we should determine do ExCog and functionalism use 
functions for the same purpose in their accounts.
As a matter of fact we can roughly distinguish the two broadest kinds 
of functionalism:
c) metaphysical – concerned with what are mental states such as pa-
ins or beliefs, and
d) analytic – aiming only at the semantic analysis of the language 
using mental terms.
8 Instead simply claiming, for instance––C-fibres are being stimulated = being in 
pain––and thus opening a problem of how to account for the distinctness of the phenom-
enal property by which we identify the state of being in pain which is clearly deeply dif-
ferent from the purely objective physical property of being a stimulated C-fiber by which 
we identify the same state, the functionalist says that whatever state satisfies the appro-
priate functional role is the mental state in question without any reference to specifically 
mental terms. The initial idea was, accordingly, to identify that one type of physical state 
which plays a certain role in our psychological life without making reference to specifi-
cally mental properties which we attend to from the first person perspective. 
9 If you are wondering if it is possible to give a functionalist account of dispositional 
belief as in the Otto-Inga case, because we cannot determine a specific immediate cause 
of such a belief, there are accounts that limit the functional description only to effects of a 
particular state. In the case of dispositional beliefs we could define them as “Believing that 
performing action A would lead to event or state of affairs E, conjoined with a desire for E 
and no overriding contrary desire, will typically cause an intention to do A” (Schwitzgebel 
2011).
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Only (c) can be meaningfully connected to ExCog, so we will set (d) 
aside (Wittgenstein). We shall focus on a functional theory set to answer 
the question what is pain or a belief, and not what “pain” or “belief” me-
ans, because ExCog is interested in the question what constitutes cogni-
tion and not what specific cognitive term means. To the question “What is 
belief?” there are two typical functionalist answers. According to one of 
them a particular belief, for instance, is whatever entity which satisfies the 
functional role in question, and according to the other belief is the higher-
order property defined by an appropriate functional role.10
The first type of the functional theories of the mind are at the same 
time its earliest versions which we can find in early Lewis (1966), and 
Armstrong (1968), but also in Smart’s and Shoemaker’s work. It is usu-
ally called specification or filler functionalism and its main trait is that 
it rejects multiple realisability and identifies mental states with physical 
states which satisfy appropriate functional roles without invoking true 
mental properties in the process of identification. Functional specifica-
tion theorists shared the ontology with psycho-physical identity theorists 
and although they were able to answer the distinct properties argument 
they were confronted with the same type of objection as an identity theo-
rist––shouldn’t we accept that creatures with different physical make-up 
from ours have same types of mental states if those states play the same 
functional role in their behaviour? The filler functionalist as McLaughlin 
calls him (McLaughlin 2006), thus, precludes the fulfillment of so-called 
Martian intuition––intuition that silicone based Martians could also feel 
pain if they would be disposed to wince and moan after being pricked or 
poked, or have a belief about museum’s location if they are disposed to go 
in its direction after hearing that their favourite artist’s exhibition is open.
5. Neural chauvinism
Block (1996) calls functional specification theory “chauvinistic” because 
it is limited to only one type of realisers, which is already at first glance 
arbitrary. But filler functionalist was not so unaware of this objection as it 
could be thought, but he was mainly concerned not to allow having many 
strange and awkward physical states which would perhaps satisfy too lib-
erally defined functional roles. Affraid that functionalism could open a 
door to mental states of whole groups, strange animal’s or even stranger 
10 For these two distinctive kinds of F we find different terminological distinctions, 
on the one hand we find “realizer functionalism”, “functional specification theory” or 
“filler functionalism”, and on the other we encounter “role functionalism”, “psychofunc-
tionalism” or “functional state identity theory”. 
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Martian mental states, his motivation was to identify exactly those mental 
states which are found in humans. His plan was inherited from natural 
sciences—begin with the theory and infer theoretical entities from their 
functional roles. Unfortunately, as it turned out, the psychological theory 
was not sufficient to bring us to the uniquely functionally described neural 
states, and it needed support from the physiological theory of the human 
mind. This is the path that Lycan (1987) proposed, but this route again vio-
lates an important intuition that most of us share—that we should credit 
many different, “non-awkward” biological creatures with mental states.
An interesting coincidence is that Clark and Chalmers call the stan-
dard opinion in cognitive science “chauvinistic”, too, and propose ExCog 
as a remedy. The chauvinism of filler, specification or realiser functiona-
lism and that of neuroscientist seems to be of the same kind. They both fo-
cus on the specific matter, on the specific realisers of certain descriptions. 
They start with the assumption that mental states or cognitive processes 
are instantiated in the head, give functional or computational descriptions 
in order to avoid referring to specific mental or cognitive properties and 
then tune these descriptions so they fit only intracranially realised states 
and processes. While filler functionalism is mostly abandoned decades 
ago, the view that cognition takes place in the neural body alone persisted 
much longer. It seems that standard cognitive science is still caught in the 
picture where only neurons have the ability to carry out the work that is 
functionally and computationally defined. On the other hand we should 
look at ExCog as more interested, in the same manner as role functiona-
lism, in higher-order properties, and various, specifically external, reali-
sers of these higher-order properties. Sometimes these realisers are made 
out of neural stuff, sometimes they contain wheels and cogs, and someti-
mes they are silicone based. This is why ExCog should serve the purpose 
of steering standard cognitive scientist in his thoughts and broadening his 
views about realisation. Even if the functional and explanatory theory of 
cognition was inspired by concrete realisers, namely, human brain and its 
functions, the cognitive scientist should look back and understand that 
those defined roles could be satisfied by various different realisers, some 
of them even extended beyond the boundaries of human skull and skin.
So far we can see that functional roles of functionalism broadly defi-
ned through input-output relations could be identified with “function as” 
of PP. Cognitive process of assessing a fit of a block in image rotation task 
lies between the aprehension of the task and a completion action. In order 
to complete a task image has to be rotated, and a cognitive agent can solve 
this problem either by mentally rotating an image or by rotating an image 
on the screen. Both cases are cases of cognitive processing, structured in 
the same manner only in a different medium. This is even clearer in Otto-
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Inga case, where Otto’s notebook and Inga’s biological memory seem to 
play the same remembering roles. Also, Otto seems to have a dispositional 
belief stored in his notebook that performing an action A would lead to 
event or state of affairs E, because if it is conjoined with a desire for E and 
no overriding contrary desire, it will typically cause an intention to do A 
(see Schwitzgebel 2011). But, on our way we have discarded couple of kinds 
of functionalisms which see the role of functional isomorphisms diffe-
rently than ExCog. Analytic functionalism and filler functionalism were 
characterised as unsuitable candidates for arguments against ExCog’s pla-
usibility, and role functionalism was identified as the most suitable candi-
date for supporting PP.
6. Possible objection––if cognition is embodied it has a single 
physical realisation
In a way, it might be strange to think about ExCog, a thesis about vehicles 
or realisers of cognition, as closer to role than to filler functionalism which 
is similarily concerned with the physical realisers of higher order func-
tional properties. In the end, ExCog is the claim that “Cognitive processes 
ain’t (all) in the head!” (Clark & Chalmers 1998/2008: 222). If we take 
another perspective on ExCog and focus on the claims about embodiment 
and embeddedness of cognition we can come to a different conclusion 
about its relation to functionalism, like Lawrence Shapiro did. Namely, in 
his book The Mind Incarnate and in his “Embodied Cognition Research 
Programme”11 Shapiro takes the thesis of embodied cognition and conse-
quently ExCog to be in an opposition to functionalism and standard cogni-
tive science. Their view that cognitive processes can be abstractly defined 
as functional roles or algorithmic computations done over representations 
clash with the view that cognition is deeply “incarnated”. Because cogni-
tion is so dependent on bodily and environmental factors it cannot be inde-
pendent from its typical realisation. His argumentation can be summarised 
as the following modus tollendo tollens:
17) If cognitive processes are multiply realisable then they are sepa-
rable from their specific realisations and abstractly definable.
18) Cognitive processes deeply depend on the body in which they are 
incarnated, and are unseparable from it.
19) In conclusion, cognitive processes are not multiply realisable.
11 Shapiro takes Embodied Cognition to be a higher category of which Extended 
Cognition is an instance. See Embodied Cognition, especially Chapter 3 “Conceptions of 
Embodiment”.
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As we have seen 19) together with basic assumptions about PP make 
PP ineffective as an argument in support for ExCog. PP assumes that 
one process can be internally and externally realised, thus presupposing 
multiple realisability. This kind of argumentation we dubbed as a type 
II argument against ExCog or “single realisation argument”. In order to 
substantiate the claim about the embodiment (premise 18) Shapiro uses 
many examples of mind-body-environmental dependencies. For example, 
he argues that vision is not only enhanced or aided by bodily movements 
but that it is constituted by particular bodily movements (Noë 2004); ot-
her examples include Ballard’s research on deictic coding and using en-
vironment as its best model (for famous block copying experiment see 
Ballard, D. et al. 1997: 731; Ballard, D. et al. 1995), Lakoff and Johnson’s 
embodied view on metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1999), etc. On the role 
of the body in auditory perception in particular Shapiro writes:
Generally, larger distances between ears provide greater auditory acuity. But 
also important is the density of the matter between the ears because sounds of 
varying frequencies will behave differently when traveling through a given 
medium. The auditory system incorporates facts about ear distance and head 
density in its processing, but not in a way that requires their symbolic repre-
sentation. There is no need to represent the distance between ears because it 
is the distance itself––not its representation––that creates the opportunity for 
greater auditory acuity. (Shapiro 2007:340)
Exactly these kinds of examples motivated the formulation of the hypothe-
sis of ExCog in the first place. Many environmental and bodily factors 
seem not only to aid cognition but to partially constitute it. So, did we 
already forget that bodily realisation is crucial for the emergence of cog-
nition as we know it? Did we completely disregard the view that “bodi-
less mind” is a non-sensical term? Mind is not just a software that can 
be implemented on various hardware. Mind cannot be so abstracted and 
defined without its specific realisers. Functional explanations leave out 
the important part––specific machine which moulds the processes it runs. 
But, can we really conclude from the mind-body-environmental depend-
encies that we cannot abstract cognitive processes in any form? Andy 
Clark thinks that this conclusion is wrong and warns us not to regard 
“functional, computational, and information-processing approaches to 
mind as flesh-eating demons” (Clark 2008: 202). We should take a look at 
larger organisational wholes as appropriate for abstraction. Premise 18) is 
correct in claiming that cognitive processes depend on their realisers, but 
from this proposition we cannot conclude that the same type of process, 
computationally defined, has to be realised in the same matter always. 
The same computational structure can be realised with different bodies in 
different environments and support same cognitive processes with regard 
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to their computational structure. Dependence of cognitive processes on 
matter is not sufficient to entitle us to conclude that specific matter must 
be connected with the same type of cognitive processes. Clark offers a 
strategy he recognises in Ballard’s work and calls it “distributed func-
tional decomposition” (DFD) which presents a way of “understanding the 
capacities of supersized mechanisms … in terms of the flow and transfor-
mation of energy, information, control, and where applicable, representa-
tions” (Clark 2008: 14). So, for instance, in a case of information retrievel 
from the environment we can have different roles of brain memory, eye 
movements, and head movements, they are all mixed together in a flexible 
way (see Clark 2008: 201; Ballard et al. 1997: 732). “Incarnation” of the 
mind is not sufficient to grant a conclusion about single realisation, in the 
same way as a particular physical realisation of mental states is not suf-
ficient to argue against functionalism. It is not only that there is always a 
level at which we can abstractly describe some process or mechanism, but 
the level of DFD seems to be an informative level of description. Func-
tionalism and multiple realisability should not be treated as incompatible 
with EmCog nor ExCog.
7. Can ExCog be entailed by functionalism?
Let us turn now to remaining arguments against ExCog. Rupert (2004, 
2009) sees PP as invoking a recognisable functionalist strain in argumen-
tation. But, he concludes that PP would be ineffective as a functionalist 
argument to support ExCog (Rupert 2004: 422–426; 2009: 90–96), we 
named this kind of argumentation “anti-functionalist argument”. Unlike 
Shapiro he does not see functionalism as endangering ExCog as an em-
bodiment thesis, but he argues that there is no functionalist theory that 
would capture externalised processes as mental or cognitive processes. 
In his view we should turn to other kinds of arguments, like Shapiro’s 
positive line of argumentation, if we wish to protect ExCog, and leave PP 
behind. Similarly, Sutton (2010) notices that arguing for ExCog by com-
plementarity principle instead by PP avoids objections raised against first 
wave ExCog or PP driven ExCog (see footnote 2). To get to this sort of 
negative conclusions, Rupert examines “commonsense” and “scientific” 
kinds of metaphysical role functionalism. On the one hand commonsense 
functionalism tries to Ramsify ordinary language sentences about the men-
tal and to identify functional roles by identifying commonsense concepts 
of mental states. On the other hand, psychofunctionalism starts from sci-
entific rather than folk psychology in determining the functional roles of 
the states and processes in question. On Rupert’s view none of them would 
capture states or processes which are partly externally realised, simply 
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because they are not commonly nor scientifically recognised as mental 
nor cognitive! Adams and Aizawa similarly notice that extended processes 
do not satisfy many roles of that common cognitive processes play. Bio-
logical memory plays many roles that Otto’s notebook ignores. Biological 
memory is primed, subject to recency effects, it cannot store more then 
a number of items at a time, etc., while Otto’s “memory” does not suffer 
from any of these shortcomings. All we can conclude from these insights 
is that functional roles of “ordinary functionalism” and those needed for 
vindication of ExCog need to be sufficiently different.
For now, we can grant that functional roles of “ordinary functiona-
lism” are too fine-grained to be satisfied by extended processes. But what 
if we find a suitable level of abstraction for functional roles so that internal 
and extended processes share those functional roles? Maybe we are being 
too chauvinistic when functionally describing mental and cognitive proce-
sses. Well, then we will be faced with at least two counterarguments: “tri-
viality argument” and “absurdity argument” (type III and IV arguments). 
It will be claimed that ExCog is neither nothing more than functionalism 
or functionalism which entails it will be so permissive that it will become 
absurd. Also it could be argued (Walter 2010) that fixing the grain of the 
appropriate functional roles has to be dependent on the previous assump-
tion about what is important or essential for a cognitive processes to be co-
unted as such, which brings us back to the A&A’s request that we have to 
know what is the “mark of the cognitive” or what is cognition in order to 
ask where is cognition (Adams & Aizawa 2008; Walter & Kästner 2012). 
We will look into “absurdity argument” (Sprevak 2009) first and then turn 
back to the “triviality argument” at the end of the paper.
8. Is ExCog really absurd?
Sprevak’s argument is addressed in detail in Wheeler (2010) and Drayson 
(2010), but we will briefly consider it because it raises a question whether 
accepting the Martian intuition, which justifies multiple realisability, leads 
to too liberal ExCog. Sprevak was aware of different kinds of functional-
isms and his main argument is aimed at those versions that safeguard the 
Martian intuition, namely, role functionalism. Functional roles have to be 
defined wide enough to include Martian and human psychology even if 
they are to some degree different. In his view, if we wish to preserve such a 
Martian intuition, ExCog will simply be entailed by functionalism because 
grain level of functional roles will be coarse-grained enough to include 
cases of cognitive extension. If we are not bothered with finer differences, 
for instance, between Martian memory and Earthlings memory, and if we 
are to consider, for example, Martian memory which does not suffer from 
331M. MILOJEVIĆ: Functionally Extended Cognition
negative transfer, limited short term memory, etc., as an instantiation of a 
memory system, then we should count Otto-notebook system in a similar 
vein. Sprevak goes even further and tries to show, by invoking several 
Martian scenarios every time describing “stranger” Martians, that func-
tionalism which preserves Martian intuition yields an implausible version 
of ExCog, so radical that hardly anyone would wish to defend it.
In a final scenario, which is intended to have devastating consequen-
ces, Sprevak invites us to:
imagine that my desktop computer contains a program that calculates the 
dates of the Mayan calendar 5,000 years into the future. As a matter of fact, I 
never run this program … However, if I wanted to know the Mayan calendar 
and explored the resources of my computer, the program would allow me 
to find the answer quickly. According to the functionalist argument above, I 
possess a mental process that calculates the dates of the Mayan calendar. The 
justification: one could imagine a Martian with an internal cognitive process 
that calculates the dates of the Mayan calendar using the same algorithm. … 
The Martian may never happen to use this cognitive process; it may even be 
unaware that it has this cognitive process. (Sprevak 2009: 517)
In Sprevak’s view if we are prepared to accept Martians as having men-
tal states then we should also be prepared to accept extended cognitive 
processes, and not only some special kind of processes of tightly coupled 
brain-body-environment systems but all processes which could be imag-
ined inside Martian’s head, like using of a program on our computer which 
we barely know exists. If such a consequence is following from the satis-
faction of the Martian intuition, than both functionalism and ExCog are 
too radical to be considered as plausible theories of mind and cognition, 
and we have to deprive Martians of mental states because their psychol-
ogy is different than ours.
Wheeler writes that Sprevak asks us that “on the strength of the parity 
principle” (2010: 20) we should count the distributed man-computer sy-
stem as cognitive, and that from there he draws anti-ExCog conclusions. 
“It’s compelling stuff. So what has gone wrong?” (ibid). What went wrong 
is that Sprevak grants a cognitive status to a process just on the account 
that it could be imagined as done in the head of a Martian, which is far 
away from the original Martian intuition. Sprevak reformulates Martian 
intuition in such a way that it accounts for cognitiveness of the process in 
question just on the basis of “in-the-headness” as Wheeler calls it, and “in-
the-headness” does not and should not suffice to call a process cognitive 
or mental. There are many processes done in the head we would not call 
cognitive, for instance processes which maintain bodily mechanisms such 
as blood circulation or oxygen transport. Thus, only if we are prepared 
to endorse such a liberal kind of functionalism we can draw anti-functi-
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onalist and anti-ExCog conclusions. Sprevak’s claim is that if something 
is done externally, and were it done in the Martian head in functionally 
isomorphic way, we would call it cognitive, then it is cognitive.
It is clear that Sprevak’s functionalism combines traits of both func-
tionalism and ExCog, but adds an importantly distinct condition, namely, 
non-existing Martian psychology. We can also distinguish the modal 
strength of functionalism and ExCog, where functionalism rests on the 
theory of the mental as it is given to us, ExCog is prepared to count yet 
undescribed processes as cognitive. Functionalism is dependent on the 
psychological theory of actual human mental states, while ExCog refers to 
what could be described as cognitive were it done in the head but does not 
have to be actually realised in it. ExCog must be independent from fine-
grained functionalism that is based on human psychology if we accept 
Rupert’s conclusions, and its strength cannot rely on “in-the-headness” of 
quite coarsely defined functional roles.
In the end, what ExCog has to assume are differently defined fun-
ctional roles which are strongly connected with information processing 
structures and not to behavioural or macro causal roles. All functionalist 
aforementioned arguments against ExCog assume that “function as” of PP 
has to be “function as” of role functionalism, which we also identified as 
the most suitable for accommodating ExCog, but then conclude that this 
identification reflects negatively on ExCog. Our claim is that the “fun-
ction as” of PP is of a different kind than that of ordinary functionalism. 
But sometimes this underlying “informational” functional isomorphism 
can give rise to something that looks like ordinary functional isomorphism 
of the processes in question, like in Otto-Inga case, which can then be 
confused for a main motivator of ExCog. ExCog should not be concerned 
with functional similarities of particular mental states or finely defined 
cognitive processes but with “coarse systemic roles” (Clark 2008: 96, see 
also chapter 5 and 6.3). “It is the way that information is poised to guide 
reasoning … and behaviour that counts” (ibid.).
What makes an Otto case a case of extended remembering is that 
information from his notebook plays the same role in Otto’s cognitive 
and overt behaviour as information stored in biological memory. Image 
rotation on the screen plays the same role as mental rotation in providing 
valuable information for assessment of the block fit. Maybe the best des-
cription of how these roles should be defined is provided in the original 
Clark and Chalmers paper when they consider constraints on cognitive 
extension, i.e., why not to count Google engine as part of my memory just 
like we count Otto’s notebook as a part of his memory. They say that there 
is no standardised answer but that in Otto’s case we should consider that:
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First, the notebook is a constant in Otto’s life––in cases where the informa-
tion in the notebook would be relevant, he will rarely take action without 
consulting it. Second, the information in the notebook is directly available 
without difficulty. Third, upon retrieving information from the notebook he 
automatically endorses it… (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 231)
“Function as” should be sought on the level of description of information-
processing roles and not on the level of functional similarities of particular 
processes which is sought by common functionalism. This is why Rupert’s 
and triviality arguments do not hit the target. On the fine grain level Otto’s 
notebook and the information stored in it do not satisfy appropriate func-
tional roles which biological memory plays; in commonsense view, for 
instance, they are not accessed introspectively but perceptually, and when 
it comes to scientifically defined functional roles Otto’s extended memory 
does not manifest, for example, recency effect. On the other hand, solution 
is not in making ordinary functional roles recognised by commonsense 
and science general or coarse enough like it is requested by triviality argu-
ment. Again, too coarsely defined functional roles enable unintuitive cases 
of cognitive extension such as the case of the “human-computer-Mayan 
calendar system”. The solution is in focusing on the roles that information 
plays in its transfer and transformations in a cognitive system which we 
intuitively count as important for counting a process cognitive.
Conclusions
When we say that Otto’s notebook “functions as” biological memory we 
can claim that:
a) it plays same causal roles in Otto’s actions as biological beliefs in 
healthy subject’s actions. If Otto wishes to attend an exhibition he 
will consult his notebook in order to retrieve the information about 
the address and act accordingly. Or that
b) information is constantly available, directly available, automati-
cally endorsed upon retrieval, and it was consciously endorsed at 
one point (see Clark & Chalmers 1998: 231, Clark 2008: 79).
We claim that by insisting on type b) functional roles we can avoid all 
of the arguments which threatened Parity based ExCog. On this account 
the ExCog hypothesis is not trivial, absurd, nor unjustified as a functio-
nalist thesis. Unfortunately, defending such a position introduces several 
new problems:
1. We do not have a complete theory of what are the appropriate 
functional roles, which would not be the case if we accepted fun-
ctionalism as our theory of “function as”.
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2. This means that Parity argument cannot be an argument for ExCog, 
but only an argument against strong mark of the cognitive. To ar-
gue for ExCog it needs a supporting premise of what exact functi-
ons are cognitive functions. Or in other words, we need a theory 
of the cognitive.
3. For now we only have vaguely defined functional roles of the “type 
b” which can be subject to similar counterarguments as “type a” 
functional roles.
These problems are certainly severe, but we do not think they are fa-
tal. Especially problematic is the fact that the Parity argument is dethroned 
as the best argument in favour of ExCog. By introduction of Parity argu-
ment we cannot determine for any process if it is cognitive or not if we 
do not introduce a theory of cognition at the same time. It seems that this 
renders PP and Parity argument as superfluous and redundant. But con-
trary to this we want to consider PP as informing us with two important 
facts: cognitive is best described by relational properties or by functions 
that satisfies (and not by intrinsic properties of parts of the brain), in that 
sense Parity argument should be reconsidered as an argument for a proper 
(functional) kind of the theory of cognition, and because it is not some 
neural property that detrmines a process as cognitive they are multiply re-
alisable and it can extend into the environment under suitable conditions. 
ExCog got to survive yet another day but only at the cost of weakening its 
main argument.
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